Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah Corporation, Plaintiff and
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. SG Nursing Home LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, doing business as KOLOB CARE AND
REHABILITATION OF ST. GEORGE, and APEX HEALTHCARE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Illinois limited liability Company, Defendants
and Appellants/Cross-Appellees. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary R. Guelker; attorneys for appellant.
Justin Heidman, Justin R. Elswick; attorneys for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, KTM Health Care v. SG Nursing Home, No. 20160558 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4114

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS

KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee/CrossAppellant,
V.

SGNURSING HOME, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, doing business
as KOLOB CARE AND
REHABILITATION OF ST. GEORGE,
and APEX HEALTH CARE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Illinois limited
liability Company,

Appellate Case No. 20160558-CA
District Court Case No. 100503405

Defendants and Appellants/CrossAppellees.

Appeal from a Final Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington
County. Trial Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Gary R. Guelker
RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.
222 Main Street, 5th Fir.
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 I
Tel: (80 I) 960-3655
Email: gguelker@rlattomeys.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Justin D. Heideman (USB #8897)
Justin R. Elswick (USB #9153)
HEIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES
2696 North University Ave, Suite 180
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 472-7742
Email: jheideman@heidlaw.com
ielswick@heidlaw.com

.

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT 13 20\7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS

KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee/CrossAppellant,
V.

SG NURSING HOME, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, doing business
as KOLOB CARE AND
REHABILITATION OF ST. GEORGE,
and APEX HEAL TH CARE
SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Illinois limited
liability Company,

Appellate Case No. 20160558-CA
District Court Case No. I 00503405

Defendants and Appellants/CrossAppel lees.

Appeal.from a Final Order of the F[fth Judicial District Court, in and.for Washington
County. Trial Judge Je.ffi·ey C. Wilcox

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Gary R. Guelker
RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C.

222 Main Street, 5th Fir.
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 I
Tel: (80 I) 960-3655
Email: gguelker@rlattomeys.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Justin D. Heideman (USB #8897)
Justin R. Elswick (USB #9153)
HEIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES

2696 North University Ave, Suite 180
Provo, Utah 84604
Tel: (801) 472-7742
Email: iheideman@heidlaw.com
ielswick@heidlaw.com

LP

vP

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.i
I.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ON
CROSS-APPEAL ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
A. The trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Appellee' s expert,
Bryan Nichols ..................................................................................................... l
1.

Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony was reliable and not based on speculative
assumptions ................................................................................................... 1
2.
Kolob's decision to breach the Contract to gain negotiating leverage with
SCP does not render Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony irrelevant.. .............. 5
B. The trial court erred in determining that Appellee was required to elect its
remedies prior to trial ........................................................................................ l 0
C. The trial court erred when it denied Appellee's request for statutory
prejudgment interest .......................................................................................... 15
II.

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 21

III.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................... 22

Pageiofi
vi)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.,
852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1993), 884 P.2d 1236 (Utah 1994) ........... I 6, 17, 18, 20
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989) .............................. 17, 18, 20
Christensen v. Eggen, 577 N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1998) ..................................................... 14
Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. I 003 (Utah 1907) ...................... 16
Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119 .................................................................. 15
Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 261 Neb. 98, 621 N.W.2d 529 (Neb. 2001) ......................... 14
Helfv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81,361 P.3d 63 .............................................. 13, 14
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ...................... 2
Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996) .................................................... 14
Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah County,
835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) ................................................................ 15, 16, 20
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41 ........................................................................ 16
State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1990) ................................................ I, 3
Rules
Utah R. Evid. 702 ............................................................................................................... 1
Statutes
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 ........................................................................................... 15, 21
Other Authorities
28A C.J.S. Election ofRemedies § 6 (2008) .................................................................... 14

II

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'""-

...tJ

I.
..d

A.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL
The trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Appellee's expert, Bryan
Nichols.

In their Reply Brief, Appellants argue that the trial court properly excluded the
testimony of Appellee' s expert Bryan Nichols because: (I) Mr. Nichols' testimony was
based on "speculative assumptions" and was therefore, unreliable, and (2) Mr. Nichols'
testimony was irrelevant because the Contract was terminated and repudiated during the
initial one-year term. As discussed hereinafter, Mr. Nichols' testimony was not based on
mere speculation and was not unreliable. As a result, the trial court's exclusion of Mr.
Nichols' testimony was improper.

I.
vJ

Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony was reliable and not based on speculative
assumptions.

Appellees agree with Appellants' general recitation of the Utah Rule of Evidence
702 standard and the case law interpreting Rule 702. [See Appellants' Reply Brief, pp.
34-35]. However, Appellee disagrees that Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony was based on
mere speculation or assumption. 1
One of the stated conclusions of Mr. Nichols (based on his broad experience and

l.tP

expertise in the field of closed-door pharmacy contracts) was that it was a "virtual
certainty that had KTM performed in accordance with the terms of the Contract, the
Contract would have automatically renewed for at least six years." [R. 386-87].

1

Utah courts have determined that '"[t]he rule of evidence relative to the reliable
testimony of an expert does not allow speculation."' State v. Pendergrass, 803 P .2d 1261,
1265 (Utah App. 1990). An expert's opinion must be excluded as evidence when the
opinion is based on "mere assumptions." Id.
Page I of22
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Appellants claim that this statement is speculative because "Mr. Nichols' expert
report does not provide any explanation or reasoning for his assumption that KTM would
have performed in accordance with the terms of agreement throughout a six-year term."
[Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 37].
Appellants' rationale is flawed. First, this same argument could be asserted against

any testimony that relies upon a future projection. With any contract that runs for a stated
term (or period of terms) there is always the possibility that one party might fail in its
performance (whether due to natural disaster, death of a principal, or any other myriad
reasons). Appellants' argument would enable any breaching party to argue that the nonbreaching party might not have been able to perform at some future time during the term
of the contract and that, therefore, the non-breaching party should not be entitled to
damages for the entire term. Under such a framework, any theoretical reason could be
offered by a breaching party to suggest that the non-breaching party might not (during the
duration of the contract) have been able to perform.
Notably, Appellants' argument ignores the well-established rule in Utah that a
material breach by one party to a contract will excuse further performance by the nonbreaching party. (See Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct.
App. I 994) ("The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract
excuses further performance by the nonbreaching party.") (Internal citations omitted).
The theoretical question of whether or not KTM would have been able to perform for the
standard six-year duration is not materially relevant in assessing damages.
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In any case involving a contract with successive periods/terms, an expert would
necessarily assume that the non-breaching party would have performed for purposes of
assessing damages unless there were some specific evidence or information that the nonbreaching party might have failed in performing over the duration of the contract. Such a
basic assumption does not violate case law which requires that an opinion cannot be
based on mere "supposition." See, e.g. State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Utah
App. 1990).
Secondly, KTM's principal (Mr. Katschke) had successfully operated open-door
pharmacies since 2002 and had extensive experience in ordering and dispensing
pharmaceuticals and in servicing long-term care facilities. Mr. Katschke had the general
expenence and capability to provide closed-door pharmacy services. (See, e.g. Trial
Transcript, Vol. 2, October 28, 2014, p. 115:4 through p. 121: 16). Also, Appellants
presented no evidence that KTM (as the non-breaching party) would have been unable to
perform its duties under the Contract at issue in this case.
Appellants also argue that Kolob "could have decided to cancel the contract at any
point during Mr. Nichols' proposed six-year term if KTM determined that it needed to
vJ

raise the price of its services due to unforeseen costs that were unacceptable to Kolob."
[Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 38]. While the Contract does contain a clause permitting
cancelation, Appellants entirely ignore one of the key opinions in Mr. Nichols report: that
based on his experience, ~~the industry standard duration of preferred provider contracts
for the provision of pharmaceutical goods and services such as the one at issue in this

Page 3 of 22
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matter is at least six years." [See Bryan Nichols' Expert Witness Report, p. 2, attached as
Addendum I].
Mr. Nichols further explained in his report the bases for his opinion:
Given that the pharmacy undertakes services pursuant to the contract with
minimal dissatisfaction, it is a virtual certainty that contracts such as the
one at issue in this matter will continue for at least six years and often
longer, irrespective of any "initial term" prescribed therein. This is due to
the fact that initiating any change in the skilled nursing environment can
have immediate as well as time related problems in adjusting to the new
pharmacy provider in the establishment of nursing-pharmacy social and
professional relationships, and that such contracts virtually always contain
an automatic renewal clause (such as the one contained in the contract at
issue) which effectually maintains such contracts in perpetuity absent major
errors, complete disregard to providing pharmacy services, or incompetence
pertaining to the scope of geriatric pharmacy care. Id. pp. 2-3.
In other words, Mr. Nichols' testimony, if it had been allowed, would have been
that, absent its breach of Contract, Kolob would likely have continued with the Contract
for at least six years based on industry standards.
Appellants' contention that the trial court barred Mr. Nichols' testimony because it
had no "foundation in evidence" illustrates exactly the error that Appellee is seeking to
point out on appeal. A review of Mr. Nichols' expert report confirms that his testimony
was based on extensive knowledge and experience with "industry standard" contract
language and was also based upon the observable behavior of the parties with respect to
automatic renewal clauses. Mr. Nichols referred to this evidence in reaching his
conclusion that it was a "virtual certainty" that Kolob would have renewed the Contract
for six years absent Kolob's intentional breach.

Page 4 of 22
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Kolob offered no evidence that KTM would be unable to fulfill its obligations
under the Contract. Based on the industry-specific contract tenns, as well as the typical
behavior of parties in auto-renewing their closed-door pharmacy agreements, it is clear
that Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony was not merely speculative in nature, but was
based on substantive evidence.
2.

Kolob's decision to breach the Contract to gain negotiating leverage with
SCP does not render Mr. Nichols' proposed testimony irrelevant.

Appellants next argue that because Mr. Olson (on behalf of Ko lob) notified Mr.
Katschke on July 11, 2010 that Kolob had opted to "stick with SCP for at least another
year," the Contract was not renewed in fact. According to Appellants, this act of "nonrenewal" renders any speculation as to what might have happened with regard to
automatic renewal of the Kolob/KTM contract irrelevant. [See Appellants' Reply Brief,
pp. 39-41].
In addressing this argument, it is worth reminding the Court of the following
timeline:
I.

On May 25, 20 I 0, Mr. Katschke met with Mr. Olson and Ms. Litton at Mr.
Olson's office at Kolob 's facility. Mr. Seeger participated via telephone. [R. 3896,
146:3-16].

2.

Mr. Olson indicated that Kolob wanted to make a few minor changes to the
proposed contract. Mr. Katschkc made those changes on his laptop during the
meeting and printed out the Contract between KTM and Kolob. The final Contract
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was faxed to Mr. Seeger for signature on behalf of Kolob. [R. 3896, 146: 19147:4].
3.

Mr. Seeger signed the Contract on behalf of Kolob and emailed and faxed it back
so Mr. Katschke could sign it on behalf of KTM. [R. 3896, 147:4-7].

4.

Paragraph one of the Contract indicates that the initial service date is June 28,
2010. [R. 3896, 50:13-17; Tr. Exhibit l].

5.

Mr. Seeger testified that this start-date was chosen to allow Kolob at least thirtydays to notify SCP of Kolob 's decision to cancel its existing pharmaceutical
contract. [R. 3896, p. 50).

6.

On the same day that KTM and Kolob signed the Contract (May 25, 2010), Mr.
Olson contacted SCP's local manager, Steve Woods ("Mr. Woods"), to let him
know that Kolob would no longer be using SCP for its pharmaceutical needs. [R.
3895, 131 :23-132:6].

7.

Mr. Woods responded by stating that Kolob's contract was still in effect with SPC.
[R. 3895, 132:9-10].

8.

Later, on May 25, 2010, Mr. Olson sent an email to Mr. Katschke stating that he
disagreed with Kol ob' s interpretation of their contract and that Ko lob was "locked
in for 5 more months." Mr. Olson indicated that Kolob disagreed with SCP's
interpretation and that Kolob should be able to give a 30-day notice as originally
planned. [R. 3895, 134: I I; Tr. Exhibit 2].

Page 6 of 22
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9.

Mr. Seeger also contacted Mr. Katschke and explained the situation to Mr.
Katschke and told him that Kolob wanted to begin service with KTM as soon as
Kolob could terminate its current contract with SCP. [R. 3896, 50:21-51 :8].

10.

On June 7, 2010, Mr. Olson sent another email to Mr. Katschke indicating
"apparently we are not going to be able to get out of our contract with Omni [i.e.
SCP] until the end of October". [R. 3895, 151: 17; Tr. Exhibit 4].

11.

When asked at trial to read the November 1, 2007 contract between Kolob and
SCP, Mr. Olson testified that he understood that the Ko lob/SCP contract was to
continue through October 31, 2009 and then would be automatically renewed for

additional one-year periods unless either party notified the other in writing no less
than 120 days prior to the expiration of the initial term. [R. 3895, 165: 11-166: 11 ].
12.

When asked at trial if a notice of non-renewal was sent to SCP prior to the initial
term's conclusion, Mr. Olson responded "[n]ot to my knowledge." Mr. Olson also
stated that his understanding was that Kolob's contract with SCP had been
automatically extended for another one-year period, thereby terminating on
October 31, 2010. [R. 3895, 166:12-167:2].

13.

Mr. Olson testified that, at the time of negotiations with Mr. Katschke, he believed
the Contract between Kolob and SCP had been previously terminated because of a
mutual agreement between Mr. Seeger and Mr. Eads. [R. 3895, 167:23-168: I].

14.

Contrary to Mr. Olson's testimony, Mr. Seeger testified that on June 24,2010, Mr.
Olson, on behalf of Kolob, signed an entirely new contract with SCP. SCP
countersigned the contract on June 28, 2010. This new contract was executed only
Page 7 of22
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four days before the effective date of Kolob's Contract with KTM was to
commence. [R. 3896, 55: 13-19, Tr. Exhibit 8].
15.

On July 1, 2010, the new contract between SCP and Kolob became effective (only
two days after KTM's contract became effective). [R. 3895, 168:16-169:8, Tr.
Exhibit 8].

16.

At trial, counsel for KTM asked Mr. Olson: "So my question to you is, why did
you create a new contract [with SCP] when your term was, a, autorenewing and, b,
wasn't going to expire for another five months-four months?" [R. 3895, 170:58].

17.

Mr. Olson testified that he did not know why he signed an entirely new contract
with SCP when the original contract term was not going to expire for another four
or five months and would auto-renew in any case. [R. 3895, 170:5-18].

18.

Neither Mr. Seeger nor Mr. Olson disclosed to Mr. Katschke that a new contract
had been signed between Kol ob and SCP. In fact, Mr. Katschke was unaware that
Kolob and SCP had signed a second contract until discovery in this case.

19.

On July 11, 2010, Mr. Olson emailed Mr. Katschke notifying him that Kol ob had
made the decision to "stick with SCP for at least another year". [R. 3895, 154:4;
Tr. Exhibit 5].

20.

On July 20, 2010, Mr. Katschke emailed Mr. Seeger with his concerns and told
him "[KTM is] willing to wait until the end of October if need be" but anything
beyond those three months was unreasonable and the appropriate compensation
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would need to be made if the Contract wasn't honored. [R. 3895, 159:21; Tr.
Exhibit 6].
21.

Kolob refused to honor the Contract and moved forward with SCP under their
newly negotiated contract.
This timeline demonstrates that Kolob intentionally used its newly negotiated

Contract with KTM to leverage more favorable terms with SCP. Kolob 's actions are
particularly egregious because Kolob both misrepresented to KTM its current contractual
position/relationship with SCP, and also renewed its agreement with SCP for an
additional year. Acting in good faith, Mr. Katschke allowed Kolob to complete its
original term with SCP through October 2010 ( although nothing required KTM to grant
the extension) after finding out that Kolob could not withdraw from its original
agreement with SCP. Kolob ignored this act of good-will and opted to leverage a better
position with SCP-and then signed an entirely new contract with SCP without
disclosing the same to KTM.
Appellants suggest that Kolob's fraudulent and opportunistic breach of the
Contract with KTM should be deemed "notice" of non-renewal under the terms of that
same Contract. However, Mr. Olson's July 11, 2010 email to Mr. Katschke that Kolob
was going to "'stick with SCP for at least another year" was a clear and unambiguous
breach of the Contract between Kolob and KTM-it was not a notice of non-renewal as
contemplated under the first paragraph of the Contract. From the moment Kolob
breached the Contract, KTM was entitled to sue for all damages resulting from that
breach, including damages that extended for a reasonable and likely six-year period.
Page 9 of 22
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Kolob seeks to use its deceptive actions and breach of the Contract as a defense to limit
damages that (according to Appellee's expert, Bryan Nichols) would have extended for a
six-year period. Kolob should not be entitled to benefit from its own breach of the
Contract by classifying its breach as a proper notice of non-renewal.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court improperly excluded Mr. Nichols' expert
testimony prior to trial. The Court should remand this issue with instructions to extend
the damages period to six years.

B.

The trial court erred in determining that Appellee was required to elect its
remedies prior to trial.
In general, Appellee refers the Court to the arguments presented in its initial Brief

on appeal concerning the trial court's error in prematurely dismissing Appellee's fraudbased claims under the economic loss rule and doctrine of election of remedies. [See
Appellee's Brief, pp. 46-52].
Appellee has also asserted that the trial court improperly and prematurely forced
Appellee to "elect" between its contract and fraud remedies before trial. The following
timeline is relevant to Appellee's argument on this issue:

I.

Appellee' s Second Amended Complaint contained three fraud-based
claims: (1) fraud in the inducement, (2) constructive fraud, and (3)
intentional misrepresentation. [R. 0314-0319].

2.

The trial court initially affirmed that KTM could maintain its fraud and
negligence-based claims. [R. 1768]. However, during the May 7, 2014
pretrial conference, Appellants raised the doctrine of election of remedies
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as a bar. In responding to the issue, counsel for Appellee made the
following salient argument to the trial court:
Oh, I-now I understand the question. The answer to the Court's
question is direct, no. Okay. We don't get to double recover. If the
reli-if the damage from the tort is the same as the reliance damage
from the breach, we don't get to double recover. I would not even
assert that.
Bringing the tort claim and the breach of contract action brings the
opportunity for a different damage in the form of punitives, which
we cannot get under contract, but that's why this Court properly
ruled pre-contact activities that sound in tort can be brought in this
case.
We don't get to double recover. At the end of the day, it-use this
hypothetical. If we were awarded $100 for reliance damages and
$100 for breach of contract based on our reliance on the contract-in
effect the same damage-we get $100. It doesn't matter to us
whether the Court terms it tort to contract.
But it does matter that we get to bring the claim, because at that
point in time of the Court-if the jury says, oh, and by the way you
get a 10 times multiplier because they committed fraud and they
leveraged you, and they knew what they were doing, and it fits
exactly their time frame, and they can't even give you an
explanation why they told you June because the contract they had in
place plainly on its face says it doesn't regard to a fraudulent
inducement or a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We don'tthere's nothing that says that, that I know of.

We certainly-and at the same time if-but if it's a double recovery
with regard to if we prevail on both, if the jury came back and said
Mr. Heideman, your client is successful, you've proven fraudulent
inducement, you've proven fraudulent misrepresentation. Your
damages based on those reliances arc X number of dollars, and they
equate from these things, specifically that you went forward and
relied on this contract and the breach of contract is-the damages
there are because you relied on the contract, that number is going to
be the same. It's not going to be added on top.
Page 11 of22
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[May 7, 2014 Hearing Transcript, pp. 73-76].
3.

During the pretrial conference on June 5, 2014, Appellants renewed their
request that the trial court exclude KTM 's fraud claim pursuant to a theory
of election of remedies. [See June 5, 2014 Minute Entry, attached as
Addendum 2].

4.

Both parties provided additional briefing. [R. 2098-2104; 2122-2131 ].
After additional briefing by the parties, the trial court issued a ruling on
September 5, 2014, dismissing KTM's fraud-based claims under an
election of remedies analysis. The trial court also noted that any post-

contract tort claims based on the breach of contract were precluded by the
economic loss rule [See September 5, 2014 Minute Entry, Addendum 3].
5.

KTM filed a Motion to Reconsider the dismissal of the fraud-based claims
arguing that the economic loss doctrine did not bar common law fraud and
misrepresentation claims that are based on independent duties. [R. 22632288]. Appellants opposed, arguing that the trial court's dismissal of
KTM's fraud claims was based primarily on the doctrine of election of
remedies, not on the economic loss rule. [R. 2339-2347].

6.

KTM responded in its Reply that at the September 5, 2014 hearing, the trial
court's reliance on the election of remedies doctrine was limited to precontract torts. Because KTM's allegations of fraudulent conduct were
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related to the period c{fter the Contract was executed, those torts were not
precluded by the economic loss doctrine. [R. 2433].
7.

On October 8, 2014, in ruling on the election of remedies question, the trial
court determined that as a result of KTM's fraudulent inducement claim,
KTM was required to either avoid the contract and seek damages (such as
reliance and punitive damages) or alternatively affirm the contract and seek
breach of contract damages. The trial court found that KTM had chosen to
affirm the Contract and was therefore precluded by the doctrine of election
of remedies and the economic loss rule from pursuing its remaining tort
claims (i.e. fraud in the inducement, constructive fraud, intentional
misrepresentation and negligent representation). The trial court dismissed
all of those claims. [R. 2324-2326].

The trial court plainly erred in forcing Appellee to elect is remedies several
months before trial. In Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, 361 P.3d 63, 2015, the
Utah Supreme Court considered whether an employee who had received workers'
compensation benefits was barred from bringing additional claims against her employer.
The Helf court first analyzed the history and development of the doctrine of election of
remedies and then confirmed that plaintiffs are entitled to present inconsistent theories of
liability at trial:
In a later case, we confirmed that modern pleading rules dictate that a court
may not require a plaintiff to elect between inconsistent claims prior
to trial:

Page 13 of:!:!

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 8( e) of our Rules of Civil Procedure permits either party to plead in
the alternative, either in one count or defense, or in separate counts or
defenses. To require a party to make an election between the alternative
counts or defenses, particularly at the pretrial stage of the proceedings,
would be to emasculate the rule and render it meaningless.

Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146, 146 (Utah 1962) (footnote
omitted). This is in line with the modem view that a plaintiff may present
inconsistent theories of liability at trial. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F .3d 1002,
1011 (2d Cir. 1996); 28A C.J.S. Election of Remedies§ 6 (2008) ("[M]any
cases hold that a party is not required to elect between remedies before the
trial or during the course of the trial or before the conclusion of trial, or at
the pleading stage; he or she may plead and litigate inconsistent
remedies and submit different theories of recovery to the jury, and is not
required to elect a remedy prior to the submission of the case to the jury or
prior to the jury's verdict." (footnotes omitted)). Once the fact-finder and
the judge have resolved all factual and legal disputes related to the
inconsistent theories of liability, the plaintiff is then entitled to the
one remedy (if any) that is supported by the final determination of the law
and the facts. Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 261 Neb. 98, 621 N.W.2d 529,
546 (Neb. 2001) ("[ A ]I though initially a buyer may present both theories
and need not elect between them, the finding of either final acceptance or
revocation of acceptance of nonconforming goods ultimately determines
the available remedy." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Thus unless another doctrine, such as estoppel, dictates that a plaintiffs
election among inconsistent remedies is final at an earlier stage of the
litigation, an election is not binding "until one remedy is pursued to a
determinative conclusion." Christensen v. Eggen, 577 N.W.2d 221, 224
(Minn. 1998) (emphasis omitted).

Helfv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ~~ 76-77.
The He(l court's rationale is directly apropos to Appellee's counsel's argument
during the May 7, 2014 hearing and in Appellee's subsequent briefing on the issue.
Appellee's counsel pointed out that Appellee should be allowed to present both its breach
of contract claim and fraud-based claims because the breach and fraud claims have
different standards of proof and because Appellee would potentially be entitled to
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punitive damages if fraud was established at trial. Appellee's counsel acknowledged that
it would not be entitled to "double recovery." However, the difference in a damage award
for breach of contract versus an award (that could include punitive damages) for fraud
could be significant.
Appellee's request that both theories be allowed to be presented at trial was
appropriate and the trial court committed plain error by requiring Appellee to elect either
the breach of contract theory or fraud theory prior to trial. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the trial court's dismissal of KTM's fraud-based claims under the correctness
standard of review.

C.

The trial court erred when it denied Appellee's request for statutory
prejudgment interest.

In their Reply Brief, Appellants reassert their position that the trial court properly
denied Appellees an award of statutory prejudgment interest. Appellants' fail to address
their own prior admission to the trial court that Appellee is entitled to statutory
prejudgment interest of I 0% per annum based on Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2). 2
Instead, Appellants recant their prior admission and argue that the jury in the
instant case did not rely upon "fixed standards of valuation" in determining damagesand therefore, an award of prejudgment interest is not supportable per Shoreline Dev.,
2

Appellants stated: "The I .5% penalty provision, by its terms, does not apply to
contractual breaches. Therefore, there is no basis for this court to calculate prejudgment
interest at I .5% per month rate. Rather, the appropriate rate of interest is "I 0% per
annum," which is the default rate of interest for cases involving a breach of contract. See
Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119, ~il 39-44 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 15-11(2)). Under this approach, the appropriate judgment, including prejudgment interest, is
$363,081.37. [R. 3933].
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Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) (the principal case relied on by the
trial court in denying prejudgment interest to Appellees). [R. 4235].
The framework analysis for determining whether statutory prejudgment interest is
appropriate has been articulated in prior Utah cases. That framework can be summarized
as follows:
( 1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

"The determining factor in awarding prejudgment interest is whether
the damages upon which prejudgment interest is sought can be
calculated with mathematical certainty." Shoreline Dev., 835 P.2d at
211 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
"Mathematical certainty" may be achieved where the "loss is fixed
at a particular time and the amount can be fixed with accuracy." Id.
"Utah courts award prejudgment interest in cases where 'damages
are complete' and can be measured by 'fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value."' Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT
41, iJ 17 (citing Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 32 Utah 101, 88
P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907)).
If the fact-finder uses "best judgment as to valuation rather than
fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is inappropriate."
Shoreline Dev., 835 P .2d at 211 (internal citations and quotations
omitted). For example, "prejudgment interest is typically denied
where damage amounts are to be determined by the broad discretion
of the jury including all personal injury cases, cases of death by
wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment and all cases where
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of
the jury to assess at the time of the trial." Smith v. Fairfax Realty,
Inc., 2003 UT 41, if 20, 82 P .3d 1064.
While lack of mathematical certainty usually prevents an award of
prejudgment interests in case involving equity claims, prejudgment
interest is appropriate in actions brought on written contract.
Shoreline Dev., 835 P.2d at 211.
Where the injury is complete and the damages can be ascertained by
ordinary rules of evidence and according to a known standard of
measure of value, prejudgment interest is appropriate. Smith v.
Failfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, if 22 (internal citations omitted).

The thrust of Appellants' argument is that KTM's core damages stem from
"lost profits." Appellants rely on language found in Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St.
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Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, I 042 (Utah App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,
884 P .2d 1236 (Utah 1994) for the proposition that the calculation of lost future
profits injects an air of uncertainty and speculation into the calculation of damages
because a jury is usually required to assess expert testimony and apply its best
judgment to determine a fair amount for lost profits. [Appellants' Reply Brief, p.
53]. However, Appellants ignore the rule that prejudgment interest is generally
appropriate in actions brought on a written contract (as is the case in the matter at
bar).
Appellants also argue that in cases where a plaintiff is not an established business
and has no records of past revenue or expenses, Utah courts have analogized "lost profit"
judgments to damages awarded in wrongful death or defamation cases and therefore
deemed such damages as "unliquidated." [See Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 54 citing

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1989)].
However, the quantum and type of evidence provided by the expert in the case at
bar is entirely different from the expert evidence provided Anesthesiologists Assocs. and

Canyon Count,y Store cases. In that case, the court noted:
The damages at the time of the [defendant's] breach were by no means
ascertainable with mathematical certainty. Despite the fact that [plaintiff's]
expert used sound mathematical methods in arriving at his damages
estimate, he did not use the only possible method, nor did he measure the
damages against a fixed standard. The factfinder in this case had to assess
expert testimony and apply its best judgment to determine a fair amount for
lost profits. While the expert's estimates were a reliable enough basis for
awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those estimates are by
no means the only way to arrive at [plaintiff's] damages. Given the
uncertainty inherent in predicting lost future profits in this case, we affirm
the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest.
Page 17 ofn
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Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d I 030, I 042
(emphasis added).

It is apparent that the expert in Anesthesiologists Assocs. did not rely upon
an unchallenged, singular fixed standard for determining lost profits. As a result,
the court found that sufficient speculation was injected into the expert's
methodology to sustain the denial of prejudgment interest.
In Canyon Country Store, the denial of prejudgment interest was sustained
because the plaintiffs business had not been in business long enough to establish a
long-term history of profits (and for a variety of other reasons that tended to make
a lost-profit calculation more speculative than not):
In this case, we view the grocery store's loss-of-profits damage as
analogous to damages awarded in wrongful death or defamation cases and
therefore unliquidated. While the basis of the "formula" used to determine
Canyon Country's lost profits may have been sufficient for the jury to
render a verdict in favor of Canyon Country, it is too speculative to allow
for the addition of prejudgment interest. The store was not an established
business with a long-term history of profits. It was open for approximately
fourteen months and never made a net profit. Due to pending foreclosure
and bankruptcy proceedings, it is uncertain whether the store could have
stayed in business even had the insurance claim been promptly paid. The
purpose of a prejudgment interest award is to compensate a plaintiff for
actual loss or to prevent a defendant's unjust enrichment. There was no
unjust gain by the insurers in this case, and with the amount of uncertainty
involved in determining an actual loss, it would have been inappropriate for
the trial court to allow for the addition of prejudgment interest.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989).
In contrast to both Anesthesiologists Assocs. and Canyon County Store

Case, Appellants' expert, David Kammerer, provided extensive and detailed
testimony as to the calculable lost profits. [See Trial Transcript, Vol. 3, October
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29, 2014, pp. 94-108; Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, October 30, 2014, pp. 7- I 92].

3

Appellee agreed with Mr. Kammerer's analysis of damages to such a degree that
Appellee decided not call its own expert (Scott Kimber). Importantly, the metrics
used to gauge KTM's lost profit were based on pre-existing data-not on
speculative information.
Appellants' legal counsel, in fact, argued to the jury that the calculation of
..ii

lost profits was "simple" and based on quantified (i.e. non-speculative) data that
had been presented at trial:
Let's step back and look at how we calculate lost profits. The way we do it
is pretty simple, revenue minus cost.
Now with respect to revenue, we know that that number is. How do we
know what that number is? Because we know how much Superior Care
received when it was Kolob 's closed-door pharmacy from July 20 IO to July
2011. We know this because you have documents-it's Exhibit 17-that
show how much Kolob paid to KTM during the relevant time period. And
we also know how much Superior received from Kolob's long-term care
residents during the relevant time period. You've just got to look at Exhibit
31. Remember, Exhibit 31 listed all the revenue per month that Superior
Care received from Kolob's long-term care patients during the relevant
time period.
In other words, what I'm saying, folks, is that you don't need to concern
yourselves with average drug price, you don't need to concern yourself
with what would the number of prescriptions have been during that time
period. You don't need to make those estimates because Superior Care's
records show exactly what KTM would have received because Superior
Care was dispensing the very same drugs, and the contracts were nearly
3

Mr. Kammerer's testimony focused on the following core exhibits: Plaintiffs Exhibit 1
(Facility Agreement between KTM and Kolob), Plaintiffs Exhibit 17 (Superior Care
Medicare Part A Payments), Plaintiffs Exhibit 31 (Superior Care's Third-Party
Revenue), Defendants' Exhibit 81 (Expected profit/loss sheet for KTM prepared by Mr.
Kammerer) and Defendants Exhibit 85 (KTM's Projected Revenue/Cost for Kolob's
Medicare Part A & Managed Care Residents for July 20 I 0-September 20 I 0).
Page 19 ofn
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identical. The only difference is that Superior was charging Kolob a higher
price. (Emphasis added).
(Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, October 30, 2014, p. 300: 10 through p. 301: 12). 4
In other words, the jury was not required to determine damages based on data that
was variable, or broadly speculative. The revenue that KTM would have earned was
precisely quantified. Similarly, the costs that KTM was expected to incur were quantified
with specificity.
Both the Anesthesiologists Assocs. and Canyon County Store Case cases, however,
are plagued with specific "uncertainties" that ultimately rendered the "damages"
calculations too speculative. No such uncertainties existed in the instant case because Mr.
Kammerer relied on specified contractual "per diem" rates, specific drug pricing, exact
patient numbers and specific profit data. (See, e.g. Trial Transcript, Vol. 4, October 30,
2014, p. 16: 1-25, p. 24: I through p. 27:21, p. 29:3-24, p .69: 16 through p. 72:25, p.
76:23 through p. 77:22). Furthermore, Mr. Kammerer's general methodology for
assessing profit and loss was not challenged. A review of Mr. Kammerer's extensive
testimony reveals that he used a careful and mathematical approach to his analysis and
that he relied upon known standards and measures of value (including national
prescription price data, Superior Care's actual revenue, average costs for pharmacy
technicians and other expenses, etc.).
The trial court erred by misconstruing the standard announced in Shoreline Dev. v.

Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Shoreline Dev. only requires that the

4

The number after the page number and colon indicates the specific line number.
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loss is "fixed" at a particular time and that the amount be "fixed with accuracy" (i.e. the
jury is able to rely on fixed standards of valuation rather than on resorting to mere best
44

judgment"). Id. During trial, Appellee clearly identified the "fixed" contractual period for
the loss; and Mr. Kammerer provide extraordinarily specific and detailed expert
testimony on KTM's lost profit, which testimony was based on fixed standards and
quantified data.
Under the "correctness standard," this Court should reverse the trial court's
determination that KTM was not entitled to statutory prejudgment interest at the rate of
10% per annum pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2). This Court should also remand
the issue with instructions that the exact prejudgment interest amount be determined
based on the damages awarded and in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2).
II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Appellee respectfully requests that the Court:
Determine that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of Bryan
Nichols as to industry standard contracts in closed-door pharmacy agreements;
2.

Determine that Appellee's fraud-based claims were improperly dismissed;

3.

Determine that the trial court erred in denying Appellee prejudgment interest in
the statutory amount of 10% pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2).

v;J

DATED AND SIGNED October 10, 2017.
HEIDEMAN & ASSOCIATES

/!)/Justin D. Heideman

JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN
Attorney/or Plaintiff and Appellee/Cross-Appellant_KTM Health Care, Inc.
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JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB #8897)

TRAVIS LARSEN (USB # 11697)
HEIDEMAN, :McKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, LLC
134 North 200 East, Ste. 210
St. George, Utah 84 770
Telephone: (435) 656-3696
Fax: (435) 986-0095
tlarsen@hmho-law.com
heideman@hmho-law.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
'\,VASHING TON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KTM HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah

RULE 26(a)(3)(B) EXPERT 'WITNESS

Corporation,

REPORT
Plaintiff,
vs.
SG NURSING HOME, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, doing business as
KOLOB CARE AND REHABILITATION
OF ST. GEORGE,

Case No.: 100503405
Judge: G. Rand Beacham

Defendant.

'WRITTEN EXPERT REPORT OF BRYAN NICHOLS
I, Bryan Nichols, am the partner I director of pharmacy for Palliative Care Pharmacy and
Phmmacy Services, LLC. I have been asked by Plaintiff in this action to provide expert
testimony with respect to the typical industry standard duration of contracts such as the one at
issue in this matter for the provision of pharmaceutical services and products. This report, in

~
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conjw1ction with the attached supporting addenda, accurately reflects my opinions, the bases and
reasons for those opinions, the data and information that I have considered in forming these
opinions, and also sets forth my qualifications as required under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

I.

SUBJECT MATTER OF TESTIMONY

I expect to testify regarding preferred provider contracts for the provision of
pharmaceutical goods and services such as the "Facility Agreement With Provider Pharmacy"
J,)

("the Contract"). Specifically, I expect to testify with respect to the industry standard dmation of

such contracts.

II.

STATEIWENT OF OPINIONS AND SUMMARY GROUNDS FOR OPINIONS

Industry Standard Duration of Long Tem1 Skilled Nursing Contracts for the Provision of
Pharmaceutical Goods and Services.
It is my opinion and experience that the industry standard duration of preferred provider
contracts for the provision of pharmaceutical goods and services such as the one at issue in this
vJ

matter is at least six years. Given that the pharmacy undetiakes services pursuant to the contract
with minimal dissatisfaction, it is a virtual certainty that contracts such as the one at issue in this
matter will continue for at least six years, and often longer, irrespective of any "initial tem1"
prescribed therein.

This is clue to the fact that initiating any change in the skilled nursing

environment can have immediate as well as time related problems in adjusting to the new
pharmacy provider in the establishment of nursing-pharmacy social and professional
relationships, and that such contracts virtually always contain an automatic renewal clause (such
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as the one contained in the contract at issue) which effectually maintains such contracts in
perpetuity absent major errors, complete disregard to providing pharmacy services, or
incompetence pertaining to the scope of geriatric pharmacy care. Automatic renewal clauses in
contracts for the provision of pharmaceutical goods and services make termination of the
relationship inconvenient> and these types of clauses tend to perpetuate relationships between the
parties. In my experience, contracts with Superior Care are particularly onerous to get out of
because of the automatic renewal and notice requirements that are placed in Superior Care
contracts.
This is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than by the fact that Kolob Care and
Rehabilitation of St. George ("Kolob") has been under contract with the same provider of
pharmaceutical goods and services (Superior Care), as I have been informed, for not less than ten
years. Kol ob' s May 2004 contract, at paragraph 4.1, with Superior Care contah1s the following
language:

Initial and Renewal Terms: The te1m of this Agreement will commence on May
1, 2004 and continue through and include October 31, 2006 ("Initial Term").
This Agreement will be automatically extended for an additional one ( 1) year
period (each a "Renewal Term") upon the expiration of the Initial Term and
each extension or Renewal Term, unless either party will notify the other in
writing no less than thi1iy (30) days prior to the expiration of such Initial Term,
extension or Renewal Term of its election not to extend the term for such
additional period; provided, however, that no notice of non-renewal for the
FACILITY will be valid unJess it is current in its payments to the
PHARMACY.
The 2007 version of the Superior Care contract, at paragraph 4.1, reads in relevant part:

Initial and Renewal Terms: The term of this Agreement will commence on
November 1, 2007 and continue through and include October 31, 2009 ("Initial
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Term"). This Agreement will be automatically extended for additional one (1)
year periods ( each a "Renewal Term") upon the expiration of the Initial Term
and each extension or Renewal Term, unless either party will notify the other in
wTiting no less than one hundred and twenty (120) days prior to the expiration
of such Initial Term, extension or Renewal Term of its election not to extend the
term for such additional period; provided, however, that no notice of nonrenewal for the FACII JTY will be valid unless it is current in its payments to
the PI-IARlvIACY.
Kol ob' s June 2010 contract with Superior Care contains the following language in paragraph 4.1:
Duration. The te1m of this Agreement shall commence as of July 1, 2010, and
shall continue in effect, unless sooner terminated as herein provided, until
October 31, 2011. Upon the expiration of the initial term and each renewal
term, the term of this Agreement shall automatically be renewed for an
additional tenn of one (1) year unless either party shall have given written
notice of non-renewal to the other party not less than one hundred twenty (120)
days prior to the expiration of the initial term or any renewal term then in effect,
as applicable; provided, however, that no notice of non-renewal from Facility
shall be valid unless it is ctm-ent in its payments to Phrumacy.
The Contract between KTM and Kolob has similar language in paragraph 6:
vi)

vi)

Term. The initial term of this Agreement is as shown on the first page (June 28,
20 IO to June 27, 2011]. When the initial term ends, this term shall renew
automatically for successive petiods of one year each.
Termination. This Agreement may only tenninated as follows: 1) At the end of
the initial Tenn of any renewal term, provided, however, only with a written
notice of non-renewal to the other party at least 90 days before the end of the
initial Term of then current renewal tetm, as the case may be.
The language and terms from all four of these contracts are standard in the industry,
where it would be reasonably expected to near certainty that these contracts would be
automatically renewed. Therefore. based upon my review of the Contract at issue in this matter
and my experience in the industry in dealing with such contracts, I believe that it is a virtual
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certainty that had KTM performed in accordance with the terms of the Contract, the Contract
would have automatically renewed for at least six years.

ill.

DATA OR OTHER INFORMATION CONSIDERED

My opinion with respect to the industry standard duration of preferred provider contracts
for the provision of pharmaceutical goods and services such as the Contract at issue in this matter
is based upon my personal experience in working in this particular phannacy environment.

IV.

EXHBITS TO BE USED AS A SUMMARY OF OR SUPPORT FOR OPINIONS
a.

Facility Agreement With Provider Pharmacy, attached hereto as "Addendum 1".

b.

Superior Care Pharmacy, Pharmacy Services Agreement of May 1, 2004, attached
hereto as "Addendum 2".

c.

Superior Care Pharmacy, Phannacy Services Agreement of November 1, 2007,
attached hereto as "Addendum 3".

d.

Phmmacy Products and Services Agreement of July 1, 20 I 0, attached hereto as
"Addendum 4".

V.

QUALIFICATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS

a.

Overview

In my twenty-plus year career as a pharmacist, I have personally been involved in the
creation and formation of six independent closed-door pharmacies all in Salt Lake and Davis
County in the state of Utah. I have been in the management role as the designated pharmacist-incharge on the pharmacy licenses for these six pharnrncies. I am a graduate from the University of
Utah College of Pharmacy.

Immediately after completing pharmacy school I entered and
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completed a post-graduate certificate program in gerontology offered tlu-ough the University of
Utah College of Medicine, Department of Family Medicine.

My focus was in the area of

geropharmacology and geriatric care. I have been engaged in some form of care with the elderly
for the past twenty years.
I am an adjunct professor for the University of Utah College of Pharmacy and Roseman
College of Pharmacy taking third and fourth year students into my practice exposing them to
closed door, long tenn care world of pharmacy practice. I continue to participate in current
pharmacology research. Part of this cunent research is involved in phase three and four testing of
new anti-dementia medications to treat Alzheimer's Disease. Other disease related research
pertinent to the aging population has been in Rheumatoid Arthritis. Due to the Medicare Hospice
benefit, I have made hospice care of the elderly, paiiicularly pain management, part of the
service component of the phaimacies I have co-owned and directed. My research activities have
also been in looking at new and novel pain medications and delivery models of existing pain
medications.
America's fastest growing patient population is the elderly. I have formed pharmacies
and phrumacy services directly aimed at this special population whether they reside in their own
homes receiving home health (HH) care benefits, residing in assisted living facilities (ALF), or
nursing home / skilled nursing facilitie~ (1'lH ./ SNF). Our current company, Five Star Specialty
Pharmacy, provides phamiacy services to over 1500 patients in all of the settings listed above. I
have consulted for nine skilled nursing facilities.

v,
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b.

Curriculum Vitae

For a full career and educational summary, please see my "Cuniculum Vitae" attached
hereto as ''Addendum 5".
c.

Publications

A full list of all publications I have co-authored is contained within the body of the
attached Curriculum Vitae which is attached hereto as "Addendum 5".

VI.

COMPENSATION
The undersigned is being compensated for services in preparing and submitting this

written report at the rate of $125.00 per hour. Billing for future services, including deposition or
testimony at trial, will be at $125.00 per hour plus travel, housing, fuel, and food.

VII.

LISTING OF ANY CASES WHERE EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS PROVIDED
IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS
a. Russell Burnett v. Critical Care Systems, Inc., Alicia Hanson, R.Ph., Cory
Larsen, R.Ph., et al., Salt Lake County, Utah - 2011

,r\

SIGNED and DATED this

l '\

day of

tv\¥:0J

, 2012

BR
Expert Witness
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
Location: Courtroom 3D
St. George Courthouse
206 West Tabernacle
St. George, UT

84770

Before Judge: JEFFREY C WILCOX
06-03-14 Filed: Notice for Case 100503405 ID 15980023
06-03-14 Filed:

: Defendants Disputed and Undisputed Jury Instructions

06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed:

: Defendants Disputed Special Verdict Form

06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed: Jury Instructions Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions
and Special Verdict Form
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed:

: Summaries of Defendants Objections to KTMs Proposed

Jury Instructions
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration:

Declaration of Gary R. Guelker

Regarding the Timing of His Motion in Limine to Exclude
Pharmacist
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed: Plaintiffs Deposition Designation (Litton)
06-03-14 Filed: Summary of Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants Proposed
Jury Instructions
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-03-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-05-14 Filed order: Order Stipulated Order re: Motion in Limine
{Kimber}
Judge JEFFREY C WILCOX
Signed June OS, 2014
06-05-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-05-14 Filed: Objection to Summary of Plaintiffs Objections to
Defendants Proposed Jury Instructions
06-05-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
06-05-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for JURY TRIAL STATUS
Judge:
Clerk:

JEFFREY C WILCOX
judymb

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARY R GUELKER
JANET I JENSON
Audio
Tape Number:

3D/jb

Tape Count: 4.42-5.23

HEARING
All Counsel appear telephonically to review recently filed
pleadings which leave issues unresolved and/or unruled.

These

issues are legal and evidentiary in scope, needing decisions by the
Court.

Mr.

Heideman feels they can be addressed in the time of the trial,
outside the presence of the jurors.
4:45

Ms. Jenson raises concerns as to the remedies sought being

unclear thereby hampering her preparation of defense.

The Court

shares those concerns after this past week's filings.
The trial set for next week is cancelied and the Court's

4:51

record is made.

4:54 Heideman responds, citing various authorities

in support of his position.
Briefing on the election of remedies is allowed; to be done by Def
Counsel.

Mr. Heideman may respond if he chooses to do so.

ONE

brief each and deadlines are set.
One of the two current Motions in Limine may be moot due to the
new trial date set.

Mr. Guelker verbally withdraws that Motion,

leaving one to be ruled on.
New pre trial hearing dates and
outlined below.

3

Day Jury Trial are set as

Mr. Guelker and Ms. Jenson will prepare today's

Order.
MOT IN LIMINE/ELECTION OF REME is scheduled.
Date: 09/05/2014
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3D
Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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ADDENDUM 3: September 5, 2014 Minute Entry

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts

The above Jury Trial Preparation/Argument hearing will not include
Deft's Motion in Limine Re Evidence Of Pharmacist Hired by Meadow
Valley Pharmacy,

and any other pending Motion(s) before the Court.

09-02-14 FINAL PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE Modified.
Reason: Court order
09-02-14 JURY TRIAL PREPARATION/ARGUE scheduled on October 02,

2014 at

09:00 AM in Courtroom 3D with Judge WILCOX.
09-02-14 Filed: Notice for Case 100503405 ID 16157557

J

09-05-14 Fee Account created

Total Due:

10.00

09-05-14 Fee Account created

Total Due:

1.00

09-05-14 AUDIO TAPE COPY

Payment Received:

10.00

Payment Received:

1.00

Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
09-05-14 POSTAGE-COPIES

09-05-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION IN LIMINE/ELECTION OF
Judge:
Clerk:

JEFFREY C WILCOX
judymb

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JUSTIN D HEIDEMAN
Defendant's Attorney (s) : GARY R GUELKER

,.I)

JANET I JENSON
Audio
Tape Number:

3D/jb

Tape Count: 10.00-11.00

HEARING
The Court has rec'd all briefs and reviewed the same in depth.
10:03

Mr. Guelker's record proceeds first as he addresses items

raised in Mr. Heideman's response to his Motion Requiring Plaintiff
to Elect it's Remedies.

The Court has no questions for Mr.

Guelker.
10:06

Mr. Heideman's response and supporting argument, which

refers to legal precedents as stated,

is made to the record .

...a
10:13
Printed:

Court makes a record that it finds Plaintiff KTM Health

07/07/16 12:08:51
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CASE NUMBER 100503405 Contracts
Care Inc HAS made it's election.

This Court's issue now considered

is Post Contract Torte Duties, i.e.
fiduciary, which the Court states it does NOT find there are
fiduciary duties to consider.
Mr. Guelker will prepare this Order of finding as directed.
10:26

Mr. Heideman requests the Court confirm the ruling

regarding pre contract claim.

This is opposed in response by Mr.

Guelker, who also addresses his Motion to Exclude Evidence Re:
Pharmacists.
10.54

Arguments on that are heard.

Court's finding in Denial of Motion in Limine and arguments

may be made during the jury trial.
Mr. Heideman will prepare this Order.
Deadline dates are now set for new jury instructions,
questionnaire, verdict.
Final PTC and Jury Trial calendar remains as currently set.
Off record.
09-12-14 Note: JURY TRIAL PREPARATION/ARGUE calendar modified.
09-13-14 Filed: Order (Proposed) Regarding Defendants Motion in Limine
09-13-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-16-14 Filed order: Order Regarding Defendants Motion in Limine
Judge JEFFREY C WILCOX
Signed September 16, 2014
09-16-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-19-14 Filed: Jury Instructions Joint Submission of Disputed and
Undisputed Jury Instructions
09-19-14 Filed: Plaintiffs Proposed Special Verdict Form
09-19-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-23-14 Filed:

:

Defendants Proposed Special Verdict Form

09-23-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-24-14 Filed: Exhibit List Plaintiffs Third Amended Trial Index
09-24-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification
09-24-14 Filed: Motion to Reconsider Order Dismissing Fraud Claims
Filed by: KTM HEALTH CARE INC,
09-24-14 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order
Printed: 07/07/16 12:08:51
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